Hello there. Hopefully, I am not being annoying again, but since I intend to write an article on the matter, I am trying to get a chance to test my thoughts.
So, I noticed that the first part of Shtein's argument was a straw man, unfortunately, but I have my doubts about a restriction necessity of sufficient counterfactual robustness.
Say, for example, that an artist imposes over herself the restriction of using just three colors for a painting or collection as a personal challenge. In practice, there would be little (external) penalization for violating or abandoning this restriction, especially if no one else knows about this personal challenge, but that doesn't indicate that this is less of a restriction. After all, the artist would still deliberately try to adjust and discipline her technique to comply with the restriction. And actively trying to conform to the rule of three colors seems to me a different disposition from merely using three colors until you want otherwise.
Similarly, deliberately conforming or sustaining a two-person partnership because you believe it would produce something unique (whatever this could be) while knowing that you and your partner would be accepting (in principle) of a change in the relationship structure, seems to me to imply a different disposition and situation from merely having a two-person partnership because neither partner has found themselves interesting on other people, even though the two conditions would lead to similar results if they faced a counterfactual opposition.
Maybe it matters if we're viewing a restriction as a mere prohibition or if it's a creative or enabling one. Enabling restrictions focuses more on what they directly produce instead of what they impede from happening.
Hi Bataille's idol, thanks for the thoughts. And no worries, I don't find your contributions annoying. I appreciate that you're willing to share your ideas.
Your comment raises an interesting parallel, though I think that there's ultimately an important difference between "personal challenge"-type restrictions (which apply only to one's own conduct, and for which there need not be any cost imposed in the event that the restriction is violated*) and restrictions that apply to someone else (monogamy, of course, involving the latter kind of restriction, as monogamous restrictions are understood to apply not only to one's own conduct, but to that of one's partner). It seems to me that the latter kind of restriction must involve a disposition to impose a cost of *some* kind if the restriction is violated by the other party; otherwise, it's a restriction in name only. I think that such a judgment can be backed up by certain thought experiments, perhaps especially in the case of monogamy. For example, we might imagine a couple who declare to one another, "We're monogamous (because we believe that it produces unique value X). But also, if you find someone else you're interested in, go ahead and pursue that relationship; after all, we're open to changes in our relationship structure. If you meet someone else whom you feel like sleeping with on a given occasion, then by all means, feel free to do so; I won't get mad or disapprove or act any differently than I currently do. You're free to do all these things. But we're totally still monogamous." I can only say that such a couple's claim to be (even temporarily or provisionally) monogamous would strike me as absurd.
*(For that matter, it's difficult even to imagine a case of such a restriction's being violated, as opposed to simply suspended or canceled; after all, since what would be going against the restriction would be purely one's own action, one would presumably have thereby consented to it.)
Granted, we could imagine couples whose attitude toward additional relationships is at least *slightly* more restrictive. For instance, we might imagine a couple in which each partner is open to the other's starting additional relationships, but requires that any additional relationships be discussed in advance. This, too, though, strikes me as a form of non-monogamy (just one that has a transparency requirement).
Similarly, if each partner in a couple were to think, "I'm going to try dating just one person at a time," but didn't have any qualms about their partner's starting additional relationships, then my intuitive verdict is that that, too, would ultimately be a form of non-monogamy.
I should add that for a monogamous couple to be willing to accept (at least in principle / in certain circumstances) a change in their relationship structure certainly seems *better* than their not being willing to accept such a change. However, *while and insofar as they remain monogamous*, there must be restrictions (backed by the prospect of some kind of cost imposition if the restrictions are violated) on one another's behavior--and such restrictions, given their interpersonal nature (i.e., not just a personal challenge), are going to require justification.
You mentioned the prospect of creative or enabling restrictions, as opposed to ones that seem merely prohibitive. I can see how the prospect of enabling or creative restrictions could be of use to a defense of monogamy, though my immediate question to someone who put forth such a defense on these grounds would be what goods are being created or enabled by monogamous restrictions. In that way, I think that we'd ultimately be taken back to the debate about what monogamy's good-making features might be.
Sorry for the multiple comments, but a further thought just occurred to me:
Supposing that my previous comment is mistaken, and that the relevant kind of relationship--viz., one in which the partners claim to be monogamous but would not impose any costs whatsoever (disapproval, withdrawn affection, anger, leaving the relationship, etc.) if the other were to violate monogamous restrictions--is, in fact, properly counted as monogamous, then it seems to me that this would nevertheless be a very bizarre form of monogamy, a form that almost no one who's actually monogamous practices. And so, in that event, I'd simply specify that my ethical stance against monogamy is against the other form (the one that involves a disposition to impose costs in the event that monogamous restrictions are breached), the form that seemingly almost all real-world monogamists practice.
Thank you for taking the time to write such thoughtful and engaging responses.
I think that the source of disagreement for me here is that, while very similar to a non-monogamous agreement in practice, a flexible monogamous agreement where people still find something valuable about their two-person structure, actively engage with it, and intend to sustain it, seems too very different in spirit from how non-monogamous people would normally approach their relationship. Non-monogamous people would simply have a two-person relationship passively or as collateral for something else, and even if they intellectually agree with the idea that monogamy can produce something valuable, they wouldn't be concerned by it, because they would conceptualize it as foreign to their relationship(s).
In this same line, I think too that the spirit of an agreement where people should tell in advance about their relationship is different from one where a partner should notify that they would want to change how their relationship is conceptualized and how deliberately they would sustain a particular structure or constellation.
Perhaps a more salient case here would be of a 24/7 D/s or Total Power Exchange dynamic (where commands and restrictions are placed over another person). It's sometimes understood that a desire to suspend or remove this dynamic from the partnership wouldn't imply the termination of the relationship (especially when the relationship exists independently from or precedes the BDSM dynamic). However, even when these dynamics can be removed without further consequences, people wouldn't simply regard an easily negotiable 24/7 dynamic as indistinguishable from a "vanilla" relationship. Importantly, the practices that comprise these dynamics are sometimes very subtle, so mere isolated practices aren't the essence of what distinguishes these dynamics.
Now, you may object that what makes a 24/7 or TPE distinctive is its unique good-making features directly, and this would take us back again to the debate about monogamy's good-making features. But, I think that it's worth pointing out that a great part of the things that make BDSM practices and dynamics unique are their (moral and) safety hazards (there was a recent paper on this: Payton D., 2025); when understood as games, the risk they entail is what allows them to function as a zone of experimentation where overcome certain obstacles and achieve certain goals. And monogamy, even when constructed as a (very) flexible set of restrictions, would have similar moral and safety-risk implications, considering why we are debating about monogamy in the first place. So, I think that some (if any) of monogamy's potential good-making features would probably fall in the same mode of good-making features.
Pardon me, but I forgot to address part of the response.
On the violation of restrictions, I believe that violating such restrictions would be less justifiable when it's more acceptable to negotiate or remove such restrictions by petition.
If I know that my partner would be (in principle) fine with negotiating or removing these mutual restrictions if I were to express that, then me going behind their back wouldn't make much sense unless I am trying to create an asymmetrical situation in my favor, which reflects poorly on me.
In games, broadly understood, there are countless possibilities to cheat or break rules, but we see cheating in a game as wrong not necessarily because the rules make sense, but because the rules and restrictions are part of the game if not what makes the game what it's, and because there isn't any cost for no playing that game. Playing a game just to break the rules simply wouldn't make sense from a ludic perspective.
Thanks for the follow-up. On your second comment, I agree that "violating such restrictions would be less justifiable when it's more acceptable to negotiate or remove such restrictions by petition."
On your first comment, I can at least concede that the kind of relationship you have in mind ("a flexible monogamous agreement where people still find something valuable about their two-person structure, actively engage with it, and intend to sustain it") has a component that makes it *more monogamish* than a non-monogamous relationship that lacks that component. But I don't think that such a component is enough by itself to make a relationship count as monogamous. The fact that either partner in such a relationship is free to start additional relationships at any time they wish seems to me to block the relationship from counting as monogamous.
Ultimately, though, I don't think it matters a great deal whether we label such a relationship as monogamous. If someone were to insist on labeling such relationships as monogamous, then I'd simply say that my position amounts to an opposition to the other, more restrictive form of monogamy. (I don't believe that this would do much if anything to reduce the philosophical interest of the position, as it seems to me that pretty much everyone who in fact practices monogamy, practices that more restrictive form of it, the one under which there are costs if one violates the restrictions at hand.)
Hello there. Hopefully, I am not being annoying again, but since I intend to write an article on the matter, I am trying to get a chance to test my thoughts.
So, I noticed that the first part of Shtein's argument was a straw man, unfortunately, but I have my doubts about a restriction necessity of sufficient counterfactual robustness.
Say, for example, that an artist imposes over herself the restriction of using just three colors for a painting or collection as a personal challenge. In practice, there would be little (external) penalization for violating or abandoning this restriction, especially if no one else knows about this personal challenge, but that doesn't indicate that this is less of a restriction. After all, the artist would still deliberately try to adjust and discipline her technique to comply with the restriction. And actively trying to conform to the rule of three colors seems to me a different disposition from merely using three colors until you want otherwise.
Similarly, deliberately conforming or sustaining a two-person partnership because you believe it would produce something unique (whatever this could be) while knowing that you and your partner would be accepting (in principle) of a change in the relationship structure, seems to me to imply a different disposition and situation from merely having a two-person partnership because neither partner has found themselves interesting on other people, even though the two conditions would lead to similar results if they faced a counterfactual opposition.
Maybe it matters if we're viewing a restriction as a mere prohibition or if it's a creative or enabling one. Enabling restrictions focuses more on what they directly produce instead of what they impede from happening.
Hi Bataille's idol, thanks for the thoughts. And no worries, I don't find your contributions annoying. I appreciate that you're willing to share your ideas.
Your comment raises an interesting parallel, though I think that there's ultimately an important difference between "personal challenge"-type restrictions (which apply only to one's own conduct, and for which there need not be any cost imposed in the event that the restriction is violated*) and restrictions that apply to someone else (monogamy, of course, involving the latter kind of restriction, as monogamous restrictions are understood to apply not only to one's own conduct, but to that of one's partner). It seems to me that the latter kind of restriction must involve a disposition to impose a cost of *some* kind if the restriction is violated by the other party; otherwise, it's a restriction in name only. I think that such a judgment can be backed up by certain thought experiments, perhaps especially in the case of monogamy. For example, we might imagine a couple who declare to one another, "We're monogamous (because we believe that it produces unique value X). But also, if you find someone else you're interested in, go ahead and pursue that relationship; after all, we're open to changes in our relationship structure. If you meet someone else whom you feel like sleeping with on a given occasion, then by all means, feel free to do so; I won't get mad or disapprove or act any differently than I currently do. You're free to do all these things. But we're totally still monogamous." I can only say that such a couple's claim to be (even temporarily or provisionally) monogamous would strike me as absurd.
*(For that matter, it's difficult even to imagine a case of such a restriction's being violated, as opposed to simply suspended or canceled; after all, since what would be going against the restriction would be purely one's own action, one would presumably have thereby consented to it.)
Granted, we could imagine couples whose attitude toward additional relationships is at least *slightly* more restrictive. For instance, we might imagine a couple in which each partner is open to the other's starting additional relationships, but requires that any additional relationships be discussed in advance. This, too, though, strikes me as a form of non-monogamy (just one that has a transparency requirement).
Similarly, if each partner in a couple were to think, "I'm going to try dating just one person at a time," but didn't have any qualms about their partner's starting additional relationships, then my intuitive verdict is that that, too, would ultimately be a form of non-monogamy.
I should add that for a monogamous couple to be willing to accept (at least in principle / in certain circumstances) a change in their relationship structure certainly seems *better* than their not being willing to accept such a change. However, *while and insofar as they remain monogamous*, there must be restrictions (backed by the prospect of some kind of cost imposition if the restrictions are violated) on one another's behavior--and such restrictions, given their interpersonal nature (i.e., not just a personal challenge), are going to require justification.
You mentioned the prospect of creative or enabling restrictions, as opposed to ones that seem merely prohibitive. I can see how the prospect of enabling or creative restrictions could be of use to a defense of monogamy, though my immediate question to someone who put forth such a defense on these grounds would be what goods are being created or enabled by monogamous restrictions. In that way, I think that we'd ultimately be taken back to the debate about what monogamy's good-making features might be.
Sorry for the multiple comments, but a further thought just occurred to me:
Supposing that my previous comment is mistaken, and that the relevant kind of relationship--viz., one in which the partners claim to be monogamous but would not impose any costs whatsoever (disapproval, withdrawn affection, anger, leaving the relationship, etc.) if the other were to violate monogamous restrictions--is, in fact, properly counted as monogamous, then it seems to me that this would nevertheless be a very bizarre form of monogamy, a form that almost no one who's actually monogamous practices. And so, in that event, I'd simply specify that my ethical stance against monogamy is against the other form (the one that involves a disposition to impose costs in the event that monogamous restrictions are breached), the form that seemingly almost all real-world monogamists practice.
Hello again Chalmers.
Thank you for taking the time to write such thoughtful and engaging responses.
I think that the source of disagreement for me here is that, while very similar to a non-monogamous agreement in practice, a flexible monogamous agreement where people still find something valuable about their two-person structure, actively engage with it, and intend to sustain it, seems too very different in spirit from how non-monogamous people would normally approach their relationship. Non-monogamous people would simply have a two-person relationship passively or as collateral for something else, and even if they intellectually agree with the idea that monogamy can produce something valuable, they wouldn't be concerned by it, because they would conceptualize it as foreign to their relationship(s).
In this same line, I think too that the spirit of an agreement where people should tell in advance about their relationship is different from one where a partner should notify that they would want to change how their relationship is conceptualized and how deliberately they would sustain a particular structure or constellation.
Perhaps a more salient case here would be of a 24/7 D/s or Total Power Exchange dynamic (where commands and restrictions are placed over another person). It's sometimes understood that a desire to suspend or remove this dynamic from the partnership wouldn't imply the termination of the relationship (especially when the relationship exists independently from or precedes the BDSM dynamic). However, even when these dynamics can be removed without further consequences, people wouldn't simply regard an easily negotiable 24/7 dynamic as indistinguishable from a "vanilla" relationship. Importantly, the practices that comprise these dynamics are sometimes very subtle, so mere isolated practices aren't the essence of what distinguishes these dynamics.
Now, you may object that what makes a 24/7 or TPE distinctive is its unique good-making features directly, and this would take us back again to the debate about monogamy's good-making features. But, I think that it's worth pointing out that a great part of the things that make BDSM practices and dynamics unique are their (moral and) safety hazards (there was a recent paper on this: Payton D., 2025); when understood as games, the risk they entail is what allows them to function as a zone of experimentation where overcome certain obstacles and achieve certain goals. And monogamy, even when constructed as a (very) flexible set of restrictions, would have similar moral and safety-risk implications, considering why we are debating about monogamy in the first place. So, I think that some (if any) of monogamy's potential good-making features would probably fall in the same mode of good-making features.
Pardon me, but I forgot to address part of the response.
On the violation of restrictions, I believe that violating such restrictions would be less justifiable when it's more acceptable to negotiate or remove such restrictions by petition.
If I know that my partner would be (in principle) fine with negotiating or removing these mutual restrictions if I were to express that, then me going behind their back wouldn't make much sense unless I am trying to create an asymmetrical situation in my favor, which reflects poorly on me.
In games, broadly understood, there are countless possibilities to cheat or break rules, but we see cheating in a game as wrong not necessarily because the rules make sense, but because the rules and restrictions are part of the game if not what makes the game what it's, and because there isn't any cost for no playing that game. Playing a game just to break the rules simply wouldn't make sense from a ludic perspective.
Thanks for the follow-up. On your second comment, I agree that "violating such restrictions would be less justifiable when it's more acceptable to negotiate or remove such restrictions by petition."
On your first comment, I can at least concede that the kind of relationship you have in mind ("a flexible monogamous agreement where people still find something valuable about their two-person structure, actively engage with it, and intend to sustain it") has a component that makes it *more monogamish* than a non-monogamous relationship that lacks that component. But I don't think that such a component is enough by itself to make a relationship count as monogamous. The fact that either partner in such a relationship is free to start additional relationships at any time they wish seems to me to block the relationship from counting as monogamous.
Ultimately, though, I don't think it matters a great deal whether we label such a relationship as monogamous. If someone were to insist on labeling such relationships as monogamous, then I'd simply say that my position amounts to an opposition to the other, more restrictive form of monogamy. (I don't believe that this would do much if anything to reduce the philosophical interest of the position, as it seems to me that pretty much everyone who in fact practices monogamy, practices that more restrictive form of it, the one under which there are costs if one violates the restrictions at hand.)